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TOWARDS OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE:
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
PROPOSALS OF 2020
by STEFAN HEISS*

ABSTRACT
Are the E.U.’s proposals on artificial intelligence (AI) a major breakthrough
or just a mere token of an initial liability regime? Several initiatives have
been released in 2020 to shape Europe’s digital future to the next level,
whereas the U.S. leadership program is hesitant to regulate AI. However, the
recent E.U. proposals by introducing strict liability or implementing a
certification procedure are a first approximation of what is needed rather than
an adoptable bill. Based on the lessons learned from the E.U. a scheme of
liability is outlined, which strengthens the trajectory of AI’s development in
the long-term solely when it is socially desirable. AI is characterized by selflearning, opacity and autonomy, and its increasing ubiquity will put greater
strain on the liability system. Therefore, this contribution considers the
impacts of AI on U.S.’s major liability regimes, analyzes the effects of its
application, and develops a flexible system for risky AI systems. Overall, a
fundamental challenge of tort law raised by AI is examined: based on the
question of whether the applicable U.S. tort law doctrines are capable of
setting proper incentives for the usage of AI for society. The influence of AI
on liability rules will be felt along two margins: First, to avoid application
difficulties, adjustments must be made to existing rules; otherwise, legal
uncertainty will be enhanced. Second, there is not a single existing liability
regime which is capable of governing AI in a socially optimal manner. This
contribution indicates that the U.S. and E.U. neglect important opportunities
to reduce the risks of AI and enhance AI’s innovation on account of their
*
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liability rules or new proposals. However, the U.S. already noted that the
global AI race is underway. Hereinafter, a first roadmap is outlined that leads
to a leading position.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI) systems
raises the fundamental issue that “robots cannot be sued, but they can cause
devastating damage.”1 Litigation of harm caused by AI systems has already
attracted the attention of courts.2 Now, the duty of AI in society needs further
clarification. Several recent E.U. declarations indicate that the European
strategy tends to address this subject by striking a balance between,
efficiently and fairly protecting potential victims of harm, and on the other
hand, promoting innovation of the new technology by companies.3 To some
parts, this contribution emphasizes that efficiency analysis is capable of
reasonably demonstrating such a socially desirable equilibrium.4 Thus, the
following focuses on liability rules which best incentivize safe and efficient
technological innovations for AI. However, from a long-term perspective the
E.U. attempts are failing to achieve such a balance. The U.S. is in charge of
making use of these findings. Further, it has been argued that the common
law system in particular is oriented along the efficiency-enhancing path and
therefore, predestined to pursue the aforementioned balance.5 Still, as
1

United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1984).
Artificial Intelligence Litigation: Can the Law Keep Pace with The Rise of the Machines?,
QUINNEMANUEL,
https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/article-december2016-artificial-intelligence-litigation-can-the-law-keep-pace-with-the-rise-of-the-machines/
(showing that several courts have already dealt with the AI related technologies) (last visited
Feb. 16, 2021).
3 See Resolution on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
(Oct.
20,
2020)
[hereinafter
E.U.
Draft
Bill],
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.html; White Paper
on Artificial Intelligence: A European approach to excellence and trust, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, at 2–3 (Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter E.U. White Paper],
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligencefeb2020_en.pdf.
4 One remark needs to be stressed, this contribution is aware of the fact that social welfare or
efficiency is not the only fundamental aspect to align an AI framework. For instance, also
privacy, data protection or ethical standards need to be addressed properly. See generally
Horst Eidenmüller, Machine Performance and Human Failure: How Shall We Regulate
Autonomous Machines?, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109, 124–132 (2019) (explaining that human
rights only belong to humans).
5 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39–40 (1993) (“[T]he theory that the
common law and other areas of judge-made law are on the whole efficiency-enhancing.”);
See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977)
(explaining the theory that cases of more efficient rules settle more often than cases with less
of efficient rules); See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
2
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technological advances have outpaced legislative adjustments, it is unclear
if existing U.S. liability regimes are capable of promoting socially optimal
behavior. Certainly, the interaction between tort law doctrines and AI poses
questions that will shape the future of mankind within the coming decades.6
Countries across the globe are investing enormous amounts into the
development of AI.7 In February 2020, the E.U. reaffirmed that it is essential
to attract more than $20 billion per year in total investment in AI throughout
the E.U. over the next decade.8 Remarkably, the U.S. budget for AI is also
increasing and is on a path to double that amount by 2022.9 However, as
more funding is made available for AI technology, AI will be more widely
distributed; therefore, more losses will occur. Thus, liability law is in charge
of establishing an optimal outcome for society. If the liability threat is too
high or too low, the technology will not be optimally used , rather it will
either be overused or underused or even withheld. Such consequences are
suboptimal for society since AI promises to solve some of the world's present
biggest challenges: from predicting disease outbreaks or reducing fatality
rates in traffic accidents to fighting climate change or anticipating

Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (explaining that within the demonstrated model
inefficient rules would lead to more efficient rules because there would be more litigated
cases. More inefficiency means greater effort for high-level litigants).
6 Cf. Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans, 27 OXFORD LEGAL STUD.
RSCH. PAPER 1 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001.
7 See Keith Kirkpatrick, Artificial Intelligence Market Forecasts, O MDIA (Dec. 23, 2019)
(stating that AI software revenues are estimated to grow from $10.1 billion in 2018 to $126
billion in 2025), https://omdia.tech.informa.com/OM000840/Artificial-Intelligence-MarketForecasts; see also Anand S. Rao and Gerard Verweij, Sizing the prize: What’s the real value
of AI for your business and how can you capitalize? PWC (stating that AI may boost global
GDP
by
14%
or
$15.7
trillion
by
2030),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prizereport.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
8 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 5; Communication on Artificial Intelligence for
Europe,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
at
6
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-237-F1-EN-MAINPART-1.PDF; Communication on Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
at
3
(Dec.
7,
2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-795-F1-EN-MAINPART-1.PDF.
9 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, President Trump’s FY 2021 Budget Commits
to Double Investments in Key Industries of the Future, (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-fy-2021budget-commits-double-investments-key-industries-future/.
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cybersecurity threats.10 Hence, if there is no long-term roadmap the effort
put into AI development will fizzle out quickly.
The urgent need to investigate the applicability of the liability
framework regarding AI systems appears to be evident. Tech leaders, like
Google or Microsoft, have already called for AI rules.11 The U.S., due to its
statement of global leadership in AI matters,12 ought to be in the lead to meet
the demands of the economic operators. It has been argued that tort law
especially has played a more important role in the U.S. legal system than in
those of other technologically advanced nations.13 Even though U.S. liability
rules appear predestined to govern AI, proclaimed U.S. policy initiatives do
not meet such expectations. When examining the governmental strategies for
AI in comparison to the liability regimes of the U.S. and the E.U.
considerable differences arise. Whereas the U.S. established general AI
guidelines and principles,14 such as the recent draft memorandum in January

10

See OECD, Using artificial intelligence to help combat COVID-19, (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=130_130771-3jtyra9uoh&title=Using-artificialintelligence-to-help-combat-COVID-19; Report on the safety and liability implications of
Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, at 2 (Feb.
19, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/commission-report-safety-and-liabilityimplications-ai-internet-things-and-robotics-0_en.
11 See Roberto Torres, At Davos, tech leaders call for AI regulation, CIO DIVE (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.ciodive.com/news/at-davos-tech-leaders-call-for-ai-regulation/570768/;
see
Monica Nickelsburg, Microsoft President Brad Smith calls for AI regulation at Davos,
GEEKWIRE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.geekwire.com/2020/microsoft-president-bradsmith-calls-ai-regulation-davos/; See Press Conference: How to Implement Responsible AI,
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/events/worldeconomic-forum-annual-meeting-2020/sessions/ai-framework.
12 See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, Accelerating America’s Leadership in
Artificial
Intelligence,
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/accelerating-americas-leadership-in-artificialintelligence/.
13 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 126-28
(2001).
14 See White House, supra note 12; See also Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and
the Fog of Innovation: A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability of Autonomous Systems,
35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 42–44 (2019).
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2020.15 The E.U.,16 on the other hand, took a different approach by
announcing substantive considerations on liability rules solely governing
AI.17 First, in February 2020 a White Paper by the E.U. proposed a
distinction between high-risk and non-high-risk AI systems as well as prior
conformity assessment procedure.18 Second, in October 2020 an in-depth
Resolution was published, which included a draft bill on a “civil liability
regime for [AI]”.19 In summary, the initiative suggests strict liability
combined with the defense of comparative negligence for high-risk AI
systems throughout the entire E.U.20
This contribution eschews issues of how society should deal with the
challenges of ethical questions that AI evokes,21 it neither treats AI’s own
legal personality.22 Instead, the “crucial issue”23 of harm caused by AI is

See WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, Memorandum for the heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Application,
(Jan. 7, 2020) (focusing on a trustworthy development, testing, deployment, and adoption of
AI),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMB-Memo-onRegulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2021) [hereinafter U.S. Draft Mem.]; See
generally WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, American Artificial Intelligence
Initiative Year One Annual Report, (Feb. 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/American-AI-Initiative-One-Year-Annual-Report.pdf.
16 Due to simplification, the running text does not differentiate between the institutions of the
E.U., such as European Commission or European Parliament.
17 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3.
18 E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 5.
19 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3.
20 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & Art. 10.
21 See, e.g., Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI Decision-Making: Some Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439, 453-56 (2019) (comparing the different approaches
by the E.U. and U.S.); See also High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence Ethics
Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2019), (developing four main
principles of AI: respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness and explicability),
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation; DOD Adopts Ethical Principles for
Artificial
Intelligence,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
DEFENSE
(Feb.
24,
2020),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2091996/dod-adopts-ethicalprinciples-for-artificial-intelligence/.
22 See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019); Dalton Powell, Autonomous Systems as Legal Agents: Directly
by the Recognition of Personhood or Indirectly by the Alchemy of Algorithmic Entities, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 306 (2020), https://dltr.law.duke.edu/2020/04/17/autonomoussystems-as-legal-agents-directly-by-the-recognition-of-personhood-or-indirectly-by-thealchemy-of-algorithmic-entities/.
23
Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A8-2017-0005_EN.html?redirect#title1.
15
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examined. The following cuts through the confusion about the extent to
which the European draft bill achieves the objective of a more efficient AI
usage. In order to do so, the losses caused by AI systems under various
liability regimes are compared. In brief, as will be elaborated below, when
losses are caused between several AI operators neither a single current U.S.
tort law doctrine nor the new E.U. initiatives are capable of providing
socially optimal behavior. The lessons learned lead to an approach, which
governs AI in a beneficial way.
The aforementioned suggests five different stages of the enquiry. In Part
II, the first conclusion is drawn – the necessity of a distinction between highrisk AI systems and non-high-risk AI systems depending on a
probability/magnitude test. Even though the approach taken by the E.U. is
fairly indeterminate and vague, the basic idea of a risk-based approach shall
be endorsed. But the forceful European call for a regulatory certification
procedure before an AI system is placed on the market should not be
endorsed. Instead, civil liability should be the center of interest.
In Part III, selected doctrinal errors for assigning the major U.S. liability
rules to AI are indicated. The exemplified uncertainty over the applicability
of such rules may even hamper the innovation of AI. Further, in order to
design the optimal liability system from scratch, the different incentives of
conventional tort law doctrines and the E.U.’s new civil liability proposal are
analyzed. Ultimately, neither one of the current major liability regimes nor
the E.U. proposal is able to achieve a desirable outcome. On the contrary,
only the basic approach of the E.U. might be adoptable. Since the European
draft bill seems not flexible enough, it can be considered as flawed overall.
In Part IV, the lessons learned from the European proposals
accompanied by improvements are illustrated. In doing so, strict liability
with the defense of comparative negligence can be invoked as a basis for an
AI framework. As the main lesson from the E.U.’s attempts to govern AI, it
can be noted that (so far) no socially desirable solution has been achieved.
In Part V, the article presents a scheme of liability for AI systems that
would desirably control the associated risks of AI. The economic operators
involved are now strictly liable, but instead of compensating the other party,
payments of the caused damage are made to the state. In their financial selfinterest AI deployers would now act only when it is socially desirable. This
solution is challenged by many difficulties, but the prospects of the new
technology promise the capability of its application and enforcement.
Finally, a roadmap is provided that demonstrates first steps of how an
AI liability regime of efficiency and trustworthiness can be promoted
throughout the U.S. landscape.
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II. DIFFERENT RULES FOR DIFFERENT RISKS OF AI
In the U.S., no general governmental definition of AI yet exists.24 The
E.U. – finally – came forward with a definition for the purposes of any
possible future discussion on policy initiatives. In sum, three crucial
elements of AI result from the definition: self-learning, autonomy, and
opacity.25 AI systems with these characteristics are addressed in the
following of this contribution. As a result, the lack of transparency leads ex
ante to a limited predictability of the AI system’s behavior and ex post to a
limited explainability – the so-called black box effect.26 On the basis of these
three key elements, a – final – common language for international debates
on AI shall be established.27
A. DISTINCTION: HIGH-RISK AI SYSTEM OR NOT
The first thesis developed in this contribution is that a distinction within
the liability framework for AI has to be specifically risk-based. As one of the
leading tech companies, IBM has already strongly advocated in favor of a
policy which emphasizes the significance of different rules for different risks
of AI.28 The risk-based approach in the context of AI was already mentioned
in discussions but has not been in-depth examined so far.29
A stiff framework does not seem desirable at all. For instance, the author
firmly believes that robo-advisors which can be described as provision of
24

See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Sec. 238(g)
of the (Public Law 115-232; 10 U.S.C. 2358 note) (serving as guideline of reference); See
Sofia Samoili et al., AI Watch: Defining Artificial Intelligence, JRC TECHNICAL REPORTS
(2020) (analyzing 55 key documents of definitions on AI); but see Bryan Casey & Mark A.
Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 287 (2020) (arguing that there might
not be the ‘right’ definition).
25 E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 16; See also High-Level Expert Group on Artificial
Intelligence Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation.
26 See generally Davide Castelvecchi, Can we open the black box of AI?, NATURE INT’L
WEEKLY J. OF SCI. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-boxof-ai-1.20731; Alex John London, Artificial Intelligence and Black-Box Medical Decisions:
Accuracy Versus Explainability, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 15, 15–17 (2019).
27 See Int 1894-2020, City Council (N.Y. 2020).
28 Precision Regulation for Artificial Intelligence, IBM POLICY LAB (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/ai-precision-regulation/.
29
See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, Artificial Intelligence Opinion Liability, 35 BERKLEY TECH. L.J.
113, 162–63 (2020) (arguing that sectors of health care or public defense are high-risk
applications. Although a further explanation on how to determine high-risk AI is missing).
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investment advice or portfolio management services,30 and autonomous
traffic management systems should not be treated equally under the law. The
former is based on a contractual relationship (voluntary creditors); generally
affected parties can be determined almost conclusively. Whereas traffic
management systems expose risks on third parties, who are often not aware
of the operating AI system; thus, no contractual or legal relationship towards
the AI operator exists (involuntary creditors).31
A general distinction related to the riskiness of an AI system seems thus
mandatory. Further, legislative intervention is obligatory where the
technology exposes many third persons to a risk, and current rules might not
impose socially desirable incentives.32 However, due to the possibility of
insurance, the sole aspect of a large amount of losses would not raise any
concerns.33 Instead, the decisive factor is the assessment of the probability
of the damage. The unpredictability of AI adds further complexity to
calculating the probability of an event occurring and its impact. So, the more
significant the criticality in terms of an AI system, the more virulent the
urgency of laws which are capable of inducing injurers to internalize the
entire harm caused seems to be.
However, clear parameters are required to distinguish between the
relevant forms of AI. On one hand, if affected persons by AI are easy to
predict or contract voluntarily under consideration of the technology, such
AI systems ought to be categorized as non-high-risk AI. Robo-advisors
might be classified as non-high-risk. On the other hand, if the majority of
affected persons by AI are difficult to predict ex ante and no contractual
relationship exists, such AI systems should be categorized as high-risk AI.
An autonomous traffic management system where various pedestrians,
passengers and drivers are involved might be identified as high-risk.

30

See generally Facundo Abraham et al., Robo-Advisors: Investing through Machines, 21
WORLD BANK RSCH AND POL’Y BRIEFS 1, 1–4 (2019).
31 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. F ISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 50–54 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541–
43 (9th ed. 2014).
32 Concerning the malfunctioning of the liability system, see Part III.
33 There is hardly any hazardous activity that is not insurable for the largest assumed accident.
As can be demonstrated by the insurance of nuclear accidents, see generally U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFF., REP. TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, Nuclear Regulation: NRC’S
Liability Insurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Owned by Limited Liability
Companies (May 2004).
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Now, the E.U. proposed a risk-based classification between the
aforementioned two levels of risk for AI,34 namely (i) non-high-risk and (ii)
high-risk AI. In general, the risk differentiation of AI should be endorsed and
follows the exemplified probability/magnitude test. Still, several proposed
attempts by the E.U. are flawed.
To qualify as high risk, the E.U. suggested two criteria which have to be
cumulative met. Otherwise, the AI system is considered as non-high-risk.
First, the AI application has to be employed in a specifically listed highrisk sector. The sectoral categorization of high-risk AI should be reviewed
and updated periodically where necessary.35 The effectiveness of such an
enumerative list of sectors seems questionable. A public authority has to
define the high-risk sectors ex ante, before the AI system is placed on the
market and causes harm.
Deploying the basic concept of rules vs. standards on AI’s risk
determination in order to decide if a legal command should be promulgated
as rule or standard.36 In doing so, factors facilitating the decision-making
process on a law’s shape of AI will guide them to a standard rather than to a
detailed rule. One aspect is that AI systems are subject to a frequent change
of conditions as well as continual development and improvement by leading
companies throughout the industry which may result in information
asymmetries between public authorities and private actors.37 The approach
34

See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & 8; See
also Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging technologies, EUROPEAN EXPERT
GRP. ON LIABILITY AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES,
at
40
(May
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeeting&meet
ingId=15470&Lang=EN. In principle, such a risk-based approach is nothing new, see, e.g.,
ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE
81–86, 281–95 (2d ed. 2012).
35 E.g. sectors of transportation (such as autonomous vehicles, traffic management systems or
unmanned aircraft) or assistance (such as autonomous robots or public places cleaning
devices); See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (14).
This suggestion reaffirms the aforementioned policy by IBM supra note 28.
36 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992).
37 Already in 2017, global players such as Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Nvidia and IBM
account for 40% of open AI positions, see Stacy Jones, Automation Jobs Will Put 10,000
Humans
to
Work,
Study
Says,
FORTUNE
(May
1,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/05/01/automation-jobs-will-put-10000-humans-to-work-studysays/. Additionally, the most prized AI researchers are aggressively recruited by large
companies and they buy up promising AI startups before they get off the ground to ensure
their primacy, see Cade Metz, The Battle for Top AI Talent Only Gets Tougher From Here,
WIRED (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/intel-just-jumped-fiercecompetition-ai-talent/.
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of detailed sectors might become obsolete at a fast rate. In the long run, it
does not seem realistic that a precise rule will keep up with the pace of the
technology; thus, standards are superior when there is a fast rate of
modifications.38 Further, the more complex an environment is, the more
costly it is to establish a functioning norm. At present, the characteristics of
AI make it almost impossible to cover every possible divergence; thus,
standards are capable of governing several possible contingencies ex post.39
Indeed, the ongoing distribution of AI will result in a frequency of
application, which generally favors the implementation of rules.40 But AI has
a tremendous range of variation; thus, standards are more beneficial because
little repetition of the same circumstances occurs.41 In sum, the rule-based
approach by the E.U. does not seem socially desirable; the enumerative
denomination of sectors could lead to situations where high-risk AI
applications are not covered.
Second, the E.U. suggests that significant risks must be likely to
materialize within the respective sector in order to be classified as high-risk
AI. The significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the
severity of possible harm, the likelihood that the risk occurs and the
procedure in which the AI system is used. Further, high-risk AI systems
potentially endanger the public to a much higher degree and in a manner that
is impossible to predict in advance.42 The assignment to determine how
significant the potential risk of an AI system might result in crucial
difficulties. Even though such concerns of defining and assessing risk are
nothing unfamiliar,43 the broad range of AI operations makes several sectors
potentially capable of creating significant harm to the general public. For
example, even though autonomous high-frequency trading is not capable of

38

Cf. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 621–22; Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Legal Rules and Standards, at
2 (2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=999860.
39 Cf. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, On the optimal specificity of legal rules, 3 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 147, 151–52 (2007).
40 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 563.
41 Cf. Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in V ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L AW &
ECONOMICS 502, 510–11 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
42 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 17–18; E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (13);
European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 40.
43
See generally Baldwin et al., supra note 34, at 86–98 (mentioning that the core concern of
risk studies is to define how risks should be, perceived, quantified, and responded to); ORTWIN
RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 12–45 (2008);
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2006).
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hurting someone’s physical integrity, flash crashes44 can still drive a myriad
of people into financial bankruptcy.
In order to be classified as high-risk the E.U. emphasizes that both
criteria must be cumulatively met; unless these are fulfilled, the AI system
has to be subsumed as non-high-risk. In October 2020, the E.U. published a
draft bill including a first attempt to form a definition in Art. 3 (c), which
clearly indicates the issues addressed above.45 Overall, the E.U. concept of a
differentiation between high-risk and non-high-risk AI can offer a solid
baseline for further deliberations even beyond Europe. In sum, the desirable
legislative path ought to be risk-based: a framework must depend on the
riskiness of the AI system. A concrete solution is however anything but
simple question to solve and goes well beyond the ability to discuss in this
context.
To be clear, where AI systems impose high risks the potential of
decreasing these risks is significantly large. Whereas when the associated
risks are low, there is only little room for an already low risk to be
decreased.46 As a first priority, it seems legitimate to reduce the most severe
risk that society is facing, i.e. high-risk AI systems. Accordingly, the
following contribution only focuses on the governance of high-risk AI
systems.
B. PRE-CERTIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK AI
According to the E.U., it is necessary to verify and ensure that high-risk
AI systems comply with certain requirements, before placing it on the
market. To achieve certification five key features must be satisfied in a
specific manner by high-risk AI systems, namely: training data; data and
record-keeping; information to be provided; robustness and accuracy; as well
as human oversight.47 Such a prior conformity assessment procedure ought

44

See generally Elvis Jarnecic & Mark Snape, The Provision of Liquidity by High-Frequency
Participants, 49 FINANC. REV. 371 (2014); Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The
Impact of High Frequency Trading in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FINANCE 967 (2017); See
also the classic book by MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
45 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 3 (c) (“‘high risk’ means a significant potential in
an autonomously operating AI-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a
manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; the significance of the potential
depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage, the likelihood that
the risk materializes and the manner in which the AI-system is being used”).
46
Cf. Steven Shavell, The Mistaken Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon Activities, 10
J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1, 19 (2018).
47 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 18–22.
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to include checks of the algorithms and of the data sets by a competent
authority.48
It is a balance between slowing the development process of the
technology and establishing desirable quality parameters. Beyond doubt, ex
ante regulatory strategies can be a great aid in enhancing overall efficiency,
especially when involving a joint use of liability and regulation.49
Nevertheless, in context of the progress of technology companies in recent
years and investments all over the industry, 50 it seems unlikely that the
government will set appropriate guidelines and monitor compliance with
them.51 Hence, there might be at present a serious information deficit on the
part of public authorities. At this stage of the technology with its ability of
improvement, it may be a gamble to set the socially desirable incentives ex
ante. The E.U. prior conformity assessment procedure thus does not even
seem close to a Pareto efficient opportunity; rather it could erect steep
barriers to enter the AI market.52 When a country aims to maintain its
leadership in AI, the author firmly believes that the applicable framework
should not be excessively prescriptive, otherwise AI operators or developers
face an incongruent burden.

48

See id. at 23–24; The Council Regulation 2019/881, 2019 O.J. (L 151), 15–69 (The E.U.
Cybersecurity Act) (containing an approach which could serve as a model).
49 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, 15
RAND J. ECON. 271, 275–278 (1984); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 365–71 (1984) (demonstrating that the joint use is generally
socially advantageous); Massimo D’Antoni & Araham D. Tabbach, The Complementary Role
of Liability and Safety Regulation, 21 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 150 (2019) (proposing a joint use
of liability and regulation, which is based on a limitation of liability); DON DEWEES ET AL.,
EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 3–5 & 412–38
(1996) (demonstrating a comprehensive empirical study of the effectiveness of the American
tort system and the regulatory and compensatory alternatives to it).
50 See supra Part I.
51 See also Jackson, supra note 14, at 51 (arguing that it is questionable if the legislative
process is able to keep up the pace with AI); Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black
Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 930–931 (2018)
(arguing that a system of regulation would ensure that only large companies can afford
compliance with it and new entrants may not be able to do so); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A.
Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and The Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–
16 (2017) (demonstrating the difficulties of an ex ante approach: “[f]or example, if there is a
standard for the way a self-driving car brakes or avoids another car or avoids a person, what
happens when the automaker pushes an update to the fleet? How can regulators be sure that
the updated software complies with the standard?”).
52 See generally Chester S. Spatt, Complexity of Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. O NLINE 1
(2012). Also, U.S. courts have outlined that compliance costs may impede market entry, See,
e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Co., 731 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Finally, the prior conformity assessment is incomplete and civil liability
has to be put in the loop. In particular, due to the unpredictability of the
technology in connection with its extent of various potential and unknown
victims, high-risk AI requires a clear allocation to liability rules. As is
emphasized, if a large potential of harm is associated with the new
technology a socially desirable liability system has the potential to
meaningfully lower risks. The remainder of the contribution thus focuses on
the governance of solely high-risk AI systems. It is assumed that the risk test
is passed by an AI system. In this context, it is essential to analyze – as is
done in Part III – whether and to what extent the current legal liability
framework is already fit for the new technology.

III. OPTIMAL LIABILITY REGIME FOR HIGH-RISK AI
The primarily purpose of the liability system is to provide economic
incentives for the liable party to prevent causing damages.53 Only where the
cost of harm caused by AI is assigned to the actors engaging in such
activities, a full cost reflection of the price of the activity in question can be
achieved.54 Rational use of resources, encouragement of safety standards as
well as discouragement of undesirable (risky) activities would be the result
of such an AI liability framework. To be clear, hereinafter the aim is to
determine such a scheme in relation to high-risk AI.55 Otherwise, the
emergence of a dynamic AI industry throughout the U.S. landscape might be
jeopardized. Consequently, first, it must be determined whether and, if so,
difficulties in existing U.S. tort law doctrines occur (A.). Second, to justify
new rules, it needs to be ascertained if the current U.S. framework or new
E.U. initiatives are capable of providing socially desirable incentives (B.).
A. LIMITATION OF U.S. TORT LAW DOCTRINES
As technical advancements bring new challenges, it might be unclear
how AI technology will be treated within the legal system. Legal doctrines
53

Of course, the objective of liability law is not to avoid accidents at all costs arising from
AI. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716–21 (1965); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26 (1970); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence
of Compensation-Deterrence Theory in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2012); See also
U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15, at 3–5.
54 Gerhard Wagner, Robot Liability, at 3–4 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198764.
55 See Part V (proposing a rule which achieves this objective).
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are customized to human conduct, which may malfunction, when AI is
used.56 In fact, it is necessary to assess whether the current liability doctrines
can be applied properly to address the risks that emerge from AI or if
adjustments are required within the current framework.
i. Product Liability
Product liability could seem a nearby tort law doctrine for AI devices.57
In general, product liability balances the expected accident costs against the
costs of making the product safer to determine a manufacturer’s liability,
which is similar to the determination of negligence.58 Further, it is the core
principle for manufacturer liability – no contractual relation is needed.59
Three categories emerge as common grounds of product liability:
manufacturing60, design61 and warning defects.62
For product liability to be applicable, high-risk AI systems must fall
within the scope of the doctrine. The subsumption of AI as product already
poses crucial complications. In the case where software is embedded in
hardware (e.g. robotics), product liability is applicable even if the defect only
affects software.63 However, it is highly questionable whether AI falls under
56

Bathaee, supra note 51, at 890–91.
Already in 1996, the majority of the states adopted strict product liability, See David G.
Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, U. ILL. L.
REV. 743, 745 (1996); See also Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product
Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193, 2195–97 (1989); George L. Priest, The Invention
of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 505 (1985). See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product
Liability, § 2 (b) (1998); See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).
58 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 57, at 747–51; Posner, supra note 31, at 210–12; only the
product manufacturing defects are “truly ‘strict’”, see David G. Owen, Manufacturing
Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 855 (2002). See Part III.A.3. (in terms of the negligence
formula).
59 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (2) (b) (1965).
60 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2 (a) (1998). See generally Owen (2002),
supra note 58, at 851–905.
61 Id., at § 2(b). For an elaborate review see David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 MO. L. REV.
291 (2008).
62 See generally Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169, 174 (S.C. 2010).
63 See generally Thomas G. Wolpert, Product Liability and Software Implicated in Personal
Injury, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 519 (1993). Courts have dealt with this kind of products in the past:
See, e.g., the claim concerning an automated surgical system, Pohly v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-04113-MEJ, 2017 WL 900760 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017); Reece v. Intuitive
Surgical, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (N.D. Ala. 2014). With regard to an alleged defective of
an autopilot system in an aircraft see, e.g., Ferguson v. Bombardier Servs. Corp., 244 F. App’x
944 (11th Cir. 2007). Further cases in Wagner, supra note 22, at 604.
57
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the concept of a product when AI is not embedded in hardware (e.g.
autonomous traffic management systems).64 Furthermore, the question
arises: which economic operator shall be liable when several parties are
involved? For example, defective digital elements may be implemented after
a product has been placed on the market – some of which come separately
from the tangible item.65
Apart from basic issues, design defects are very significant in practice.
Harm most likely to be caused by AI systems will be discussed under this
category.66 The Third Restatement of Torts takes the position that “[a]
product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller”67. The aspect of foreseeability
might pose insoluble challenges in the respect of AI. Unpredictability is one
of the key elements of AI which makes this technology so unique. To some
extent, the core idea of AI is to act in an unforeseeable manner.68 Thus, it
would be difficult to base any form of liability on foreseeable or expected
risks of harm.69 Irrespective of foreseeability, a manufacturer may be
justified in taking a known risk if the production’s benefit to society exceeds
the overall harm.70 AI systems now pose a new challenge to the proper safety
standard because they might be compared to a non-AI-based-product
operated by a human being and vice versa. In cutting-edge AI cases, such a
standard seems complex.71

64

See the different approaches in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1082 (3d ed.
2015).
65 E.g., a control app can be downloaded onto the user’s vehicle, cf. European Expert Grp. on
Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 42–44.
66 See Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When Products Liability
Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 80 (2019).
67 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, § 2 (b) (1998).
68 See supra Part II.
69 Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for Artificial-IntelligenceBased Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1156–57 (2020); Jin Yoshikawa, Sharing the Costs
of Artificial Intelligence: Universal No-Fault Social Insurance for Personal Injuries, 21
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1155, 1166–67 (2019).
70 See Posner, supra note 31, at 210–12.
71 See Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1611, 1644–47
(2017); Wagner, supra note 22, at 605–06; See generally James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman,
Should “Relative Safety” be a Test of Product Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (1997).

Summer 2021

TOWARDS OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR AI

203

In sum, the foregoing demonstrates a high degree of uncertainty
regarding the application of product liability.72
ii. Strict Liability
Under a regime of strict liability, no design defects or negligence would
be required to establish liability. Therefore, an injurer will be held liable for
the harm that occurred, regardless of the level of care applied. “The liability
arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself, and the risk that it
creates, of harm to those in the vicinity.” 73 U.S. courts insist two major
criteria must be met before strict liability can be imposed: (i) the injurer’s
activity generates a highly significant danger and (ii) is uncommon.74
First, criterion (i) has to be applied upon high-risk AI, due to the fact that
this replicates the distinctiveness between high-risk and non-high-risk AI.75
However, the list of abnormally dangerous activities is short and has not been
significantly expanded over the past years.76 Additionally, technologies such
as AI will typically be implemented in goods of common usage, such as selfdriving cars or autonomous robots. All of those AI devices will be distributed
innumerably throughout public space. Thus, the vast majority of losses might
not be subsumed under the second criterion (ii).
A brief glance at Europe reveals similar problems. Legislators within the
E.U. member states often responded to risks induced by new technologies by
introducing strict liability.77 Some jurisdictions,78 like Germany, are more
restrictive whereas others, like France, have even established a general rule

72

See also Jackson, supra note 14, at 58–59. But see David C. Vladeck, Machines without
Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 150 (2014)
(arguing that product liability doctrine could be applied on AI without any interruption as
long as machines can be conceived as agents of a human being).
73 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1) cmt. d (1977).
74 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & Emotional Harm § 20 (2010) (stating that
these criteria are important in judicial decision-making as explained in cmts. e, g, h, j, and k).
Although six factors ought to be weighed to conclude whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 520 (1979).
75 See supra Part II.A.
76 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault
in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 757–61 (2016).
77 See the contributions to THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY IN RELATION TO TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2010).
78 See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (Bernhard A. Koch & Helmut Koziol
eds., 2002) (noting that the landscape varies throughout the E.U. member states. However,
attempts to harmonize strict liability have already been initiated).
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of strict liability, which applies to dangerous activities.79 However, strict
liability for the operations of AI or comparable is so far widely unknown
throughout the European legislations.80
In general, strict liability as well as product liability may not be
applicable at all or may only cover a fraction of cases caused by AI systems.
Hence, the majority of accidents AI triggers will be allocated to negligence.
iii. Negligence
Unintended harms or accidents caused by someone ought to be
compensated if the tortfeasor is blameworthy or at fault.81 In general, several
elements are considered in assessing whether an act is negligent.82 One major
aspect of negligence concerns the ascertainment of an appropriate standard
of negligence, which seems even more challenging in terms of AI’s
characteristics.
In particular, a breach of duty based on a reasonable person is the
standard to be applied.83 The operation of the law of negligence to determine
that standard can be explained by the formula of Judge Learned Hand, who
developed three elements of measurement.84 In short, these are: the
magnitude of the specific loss, probability of the accident's occurring, and
the burden of taking precautions that would prevent it.85 However, the
79

See Art. 1242 of the Code civil (French Civil Code), which is not limited to any specific
object or risk (explaining that the beneficial owner of a “thing” can be liable regardless of a
defective); See generally Gerhard Wagner, Custodian’s Liability, in THE MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 441, 441–43 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2012).
80 See European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 25–27; But
see §§ 89e, 91b (8) of the Austrian Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz (Court Organization Act)
(providing strict liability of the operator in terms of automated systems operated by the
government).
81 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 (1972).
82 Namely the existence of duty of care, a breach of the duty, harm caused to the victim, and
a causal link between the breach and harm caused. See, e.g., W. PAGE K EETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 657, 658 (2001). For Supreme Court decisions see David G. Owen, The Five Elements
of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2007).
83 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1979); see also Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262,
1268 (7th Cir. 1989).
84 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v. O'Brien,
111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
85
For further deliberations see John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 331–35 (1973); Posner (2014), supra note 31, at 191–96; Posner (1972),
supra note 81, at 32–96.
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standard specified by courts in practice is called ”due care” and might not
always equal the optimal one since courts would need knowledge of all
relevant facts.86 This issue appears even more critical in the area of AI
because of its opaque black-box nature.87 Furthermore, it has been argued
that courts intend to consider the risk resulting from a technology more than
its advantages.88 As a result, these prospects may likely lead to a
determination of unsatisfactory standards.
Another necessity for establishing liability is a causal link between the
victim’s harm and the tortfeasor’s sphere.89 New emerging technologies can
raise sophisticated causation issues. Victims need to prove that their losses
emerge from some conduct or risk attributable to the injurer.90 Subsequently,
the required standard of proof has to be taken into consideration. In most
civil law systems, judges need to be convinced of something equivalent to a
degree of certainty91 in order to side with the party carrying the burden of
proof.92 But also, within the U.S., as shown by cases like Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co.,93 only purely logical or actual causation is insufficient to
establish liability.94 Such an all-or-nothing dilemma is nothing unfamiliar to
the legal system.95 When taking the interconnectedness and enlarged
dependency on external input and data into account, AI adds complexity and
therefore will become much more of an issue in the future.
86 See Richard A. Epstein, The Social

Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV.
1717, 1740–42 (1982); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 997–99 (1984); ROBERT B. COOTER
JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 217–20 (6th ed. 2016).
87 See also Rachum-Twaig, supra note 69, at 1164; Yoshikawa, supra note 69, at 1167–68;
Philipp Hacker et al., Explainable AI under contract and tort law: legal incentives and
technical challenges, 28 AI & L. 415, 420–24 (2020) (noting that already the process of
choosing a legitimate AI system for economic operators poses difficulties).
88 See generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 320–29 (1985); See also Matthew U.
Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competences, and
Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 388 (2016).
89 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 29 (2005).
90 European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 20.
91 At least a high degree of probability.
92 European Expert Grp. on Liability and New Technologies, supra note 34, at 20.
93 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
94 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 THE AMERICAN L AW OF TORTS § 11:1; Giuffrida, supra note
21, at 446.
95 See PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE P ERSPECTIVES (Israel
Gilead et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that in some circumstances a proportional liability might
be a proper suggestion, accordingly the victim’s claim against each potential party is reduced
to a quota corresponding to the chance of happening that each of them in fact caused the harm
in question).
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In summary, liability rules may work well for humans, but the
applicability of tort law doctrines in the context of AI cannot be ascertained
in a generalized way. Accordingly, legal uncertainty over the predictability
of the outcome of litigation might be another aspect to be considered. Such
a result may increase costs of legal dispute resolution and undermine the
innovation of companies.96
B. CHALLENGES OF SAFEGUARDING S OCIAL WELFARE
The malfunctioning of tort doctrines emphasizes the need for
adjustments in terms of the current liability rules. The deterrence goal
provides the necessary normative orientation on how to structure liability
rules for high-risk AI systems.97 If a liability framework for high-risk AI
systems is designed from scratch, the effects of liability rules on parties’
behavior need to be analyzed. Once again, the objective should be to
establish a liability rule that provides socially desirable incentives for the
usage of AI. The following analysis takes a law and economics perspective.
In October 2020, a Resolution was issued by the E.U. which included a
draft bill.98 Art. 4 and Art. 10 of this approach establish strict liability with
the defense of comparative negligence for high-risk AI systems throughout
the entire E.U. landscape.99 Hereinafter, the E.U. proposal is compared with
different liability rules in order to find the optimal solution for high-risk AI.
Although the suggested approach of the new E.U. civil liability regime is
flawed overall, it might be adoptable at least to some extent. Because a
substantial risk of externalities occurs that conventional tort law is not
designed to address.
Consequently, the effects of liability rules on parties’ behavior are
analyzed. Generally, it is presumed within this contribution that the social
goal is broadly utilitarian in nature. Keeping it simple, two types of decisions

96

See generally Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265 (1974) (arguing that “[s]ince the costs of litigating
are generally higher than the costs of settling a dispute out of court, an increase in the
settlement rate (at least within a broad range) should reduce the total costs of legal dispute
resolution. Greater certainty as to outcome might have an indirect effect on the settlement rate
as well as the direct effect just discussed.”). For empirical investigation on the effects of less
uncertainty and innovation, see note 162.
97
See supra Part III.
98 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3; See also E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 13–16.
99 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4–7.
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by the parties involved in an accident100 are examined. On the one hand, the
level of care when engaging in an activity. On the other hand, the level of
activity. Especially, in terms of new technologies, both the level of care and
activity shall be considered.101 For the achievement of social welfare, both
parties involved in an accident should take appropriate care by increasing
safety up to the point at which a further increase of a dollar would no longer
reduce the accident costs by a dollar. Further, they should also engage in
their activity at a level that properly balances the utility they obtain against
the extra risks they thereby create.102 Note also that it is necessary that each
party considers the full amount of an accident in order to choose socially
desirable safety and activity levels.
i. Losses caused by AI under U.S. Tort Law Doctrines
First, taking the observed difficulties of the U.S. major liability rules into
account,103 it does not appear farfetched to not apply any liability rule on
specific AI based accidents. Hence, the following question must be raised: is
it socially desirable that “losses lie where they fall.”104
(i) Under no liability, however, injurers would fail to take care.
Additionally, they would engage in their activity as long as they obtain any
additional utility because they would not face any liability.105 Overall, the
level of safety would be systematically low from a social perspective, and
the activity level would be excessive since AI operators solely compensate
their own losses.106 Therefore, it could be considered that the U.S. policy of
being hesitant to legislate AI has a detrimental effect for society.107 The
legislative aim might thus be the rejection of abstract principles and
introduction of explicit assignment of liability rules regarding AI systems.
A straightforward way to achieve this seems to be the adjustment of
current negligence, product liability or strict liability laws. But even so, if

By the wording “accident”, a harmful outcome which none of the parties involved wished
to occur is meant.
101 Hereinafter, it is assumed that tortfeasor, as well as victim, can take care and choose the
level of activity and thereby lower accident risks – so-called bilateral accidents, see generally
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182–93 & 199–206 (2004).
102 See also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–6 (1987).
103 See supra Part III.A.
104 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 47 (1881, republished 2009).
105
Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 11 & 22–23.
106 Cf. Steven Shavell, On the Redesign of Accident Liability for the World of Autonomous
Vehicles, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 254–55 (2020).
107 See White House, supra note 12; U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15.
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these tort law doctrines can be frictionless applied, none of them lead to a
socially desirable solution. This is illustrated by the following:
(ii) Under strict liability (ignoring for the moment the defense of
comparative or contributory negligence),108 one must bear in mind that such
AI devices can also cause damage to each other, giving rise to a situation
comparable to no liability.109 The parties are reciprocally liable to each other
for the same amount of losses. In this scenario, both are not better or worse
off if there was simply no liability. 110
(iii) Under negligence,111 the primary issue is that courts have to specify
the level of care based on the Learned Hand formula – so-called due care.112
If the injurers apply at least due care, they would not be held liable. 113
Generally, the ability of courts to select the socially optimal level of care
might be already difficult. AI is no different, its opacity might actually
increase the complexity.114 However, even if it is assumed that due care
chosen by courts equals the optimal level of care, the activity level of the
injurer would not be controlled. Because courts would need to ascertain the
character of the benefits parties derive from their activities, this seems
practically impossible.115 An excessive level of activity would be the result.

108

See, e.g., Adam Rosenberg, Strict Liability: Imagining a Legal Framework for
Autonomous Vehicles, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 205, 218–23 (2017) (arguing the
implementation of strict liability without considering comparative or contributory
negligence).
109 See Part III.B.3.
110 See generally Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 117
(1974); Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case
of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 76–78 (1990).
111 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort
Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (emphasizing that negligence should be preferred
over strict liability).
112 See supra Part III.A.3.
113 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
63–64 (1987).
114 See supra Part III.A.3 (noting the difficulties due to the information asymmetry among
courts). See Mousa Alshanteer, A Current Regime of Uncertainty: Improving Assessments of
Liability for Damages Caused by Artificial Intelligence, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 27, 37–55
(2020) (noting difficulties in the field of AI and health care).
115 Steven Shavell, Strict liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–7 (1980); See also
Landes & Posner, supra note 113, at 66–67; Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 25–26 (noting
that in general, negligence is only defined as care alone, without activity. This ‘defect’ might
be justified by the reason that the optimal and actual activity level would be difficult for courts
to choose due to the lack of information).
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(iv) Under product liability of the manufacturer to third-parties,116 the
manufacturer of the AI system may be held liable if it caused harm to thirdparties.117 Now, difficulties occur by determining the level of production
under negligence rule because courts would have to balance production costs
against consumer assessment.118 Courts might be likely to choose the
standard of care insufficient or excessive. Beyond a doubt, the finding of
liability for victims under product liability is complicated due to the diverse
doctrinal considerations.119 Under product liability of the manufacturer to
buyers, in contrast to before, the buyer of the AI system is the compensated
party by the manufacturer. Now, buyers would wish to buy AI systems with
a safety level that they find best and ignore liability rules. Therefore, buyers
would only consider their own loss. AI manufacturers would have no reason
to obey the safety requirements and the activity level would be socially
excessive.120
It is important to note that a clear allocation of liability rules to high-risk
AI systems seems necessary to increase its benefits for society. Further, not
one conventional doctrine above is able to provide a balanced solution. Of
course, these findings are not new.121 But certainly, the unique characteristic
of AI system might enhance the issues indicated above. For example, the
difficulties for courts to select the socially optimal level of care. So, the E.U.
seeks to take such aspects into account by the establishment of a new draft
bill for AI.

116

See, e.g., Chagal-Feferkorn, supra note 66, at 61–114 (arguing that when harm is caused
by AI it shall be subject to conventional product liability rules). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010)
(questioning the benefit challenges of product liability in general); But see John C.P. Goldberg
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to
Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, A Skeptical Attitude About Product Liability Is Justified: A Reply to
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (2010).
117 See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 1969, 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d
84 (where a car collided head-on with the victim); see generally Keeton et al., supra note 82,
at § 100. The type of liability rule applied depends on the category of defect, see supra Part
III.A.1. In principle, the levels of safety and activity might be analogue to those of negligence
or strict liability.
118 The aspect that manufacturers (firms) harm third-parties is illustrated by A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. ASSOC. 363
(1980); Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 207–12.
119
See Keeton et al., supra note 82, at §§ 93, 95–98; See also supra Part III.A.1.
120 Cf. Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 263–64.
121 See generally Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 11, 29 (demonstrating that none of the
existing liability rules are leading to optimal levels of activities).
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ii. Losses caused by AI under the E.U. proposal
With its draft bill, the European Union is trying to strike a balance
between efficiently and fairly protecting potential victims of harm or damage
while providing enough leeway for enterprises to develop new technologies,
products or services.122 This objective can be achieved by using the
technology only when it is beneficial to society. Hence, the total amount of
social losses by an activity needs to be internalized by the parties involved.
Regardless the field of AI’s application (e.g. finance, automotive or health
care), the E.U. pursues the introduction of strict liability with the defense of
comparative negligence according to Art. 4 and Art. 10 of the draft bill.
In an effort to illustrate the impacts of the E.U. proposal, it is applied on
the basis of an initial model.123 The analysis will be based on a simple
example: A is the operator124 of a high-risk AI system; during its application
stranger B gets harmed and suffers a $25,000 loss, whereas A suffers no
harm. The total social costs of the accident are $25,000.
(v) Under strict liability with the defense of comparative negligence,
optimum social behavior of AI operators would be achieved, but the activity
level of potential victims would remain unchanged. Still, the E.U. approach
seems to be the most desirable one in comparison to other possibilities
mentioned before.
This is illustrated by the following: the E.U. proposal would lead to the
result that injurers125 pay for all accident losses ($25,000) that they cause
because they are strictly liable.126 They would enjoy the benefits of engaging
in the activity and defray the costs of care. The activity would only be
engaged in if the extra utility injurers derive from it exceeds theirs costs of
care as well as their expected liability payments for accidents.127

122

E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at (B).
This following will rely on two assumptions. First, an increase in injurers’ activity level
will result in a proportionate increase in expected accident losses, given their level of care.
Second, increasing the activity will result in an increase in their utility. See Shavell (1987),
supra note 102, at 6–7 & 21–22.
124 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 3 (d), (e) & (f) (providing a definition for possible
operators involved).
125 For reasons of simplifications, unless explicitly noted otherwise it will not be distinguished
between manufacturer’s or operator’s liability. The presented conclusion applies to both,
because it is assumed that the manufacturer is capable of passing the costs on the buyer
(operator). See generally Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
126 See supra Part III.A.2.
127 See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 23; Posner, supra note 31, at 205–07.
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Consequently, strict liability ensures that the objective of the high-risk AI
operator is the same as the social objective one.128 A would bear the total
amount of harm ($25,000) – achieving cost internalization. Additionally,
comparative negligence affects the victim’s compensation on account of her
or his unreasonable conduct.129 Under Art. 10 of the E.U. declaration the AI
operator’s extent of liability shall be reduced in accordance with the fault of
the victim and shall not be liable if the victim is solely or predominantly
accountable.130 Ideally victims are thus forced to choose due care131 as they
would not bear any of their accident losses; instead, injurers would be
liable.132 But victims would engage in their activity whenever their utility
exceeded the cost of taking due care.133 The E.U. proposal is not able to affect
the activity level of potential victims. B may engage in her or his activity
excessively. How significant this deficiency really is cannot be explained in
a generalized way. The severity of this defect depends on the expected
magnitude of the losses caused by an activity. If the activity by its nature
creates substantial risks, it would be desirable to control the risk – as it is
done with the activity level of the high-risk AI operator. The activity level
of victims might not be a crucial factor, especially when they participate in
activities of ordinary life (like walking).134
Considering that A is the operator of a self-driving car and B is a
pedestrian, the activity level of B might not be significant. In this case, B’s
optimum level of care might already be sufficient.
In sum, it seems certainly conceivable that the introduced E.U.
legislative framework can direct a desirable solution for AI. Such an
approach, however, needs to be flexible enough to provide optimal
incentives when high-risk AI systems cause damage to each other.
128

See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 23.
In some circumstances the victim may only recover a portion of the suffered loss.
Comparative negligence originates from contributory negligence which features an all-ornothing rule. See generally A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, Study of Comparative
Negligence, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 333 (1932); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative
Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978). In an ideal complete-information world
the effects on the care level vanish between comparative and contributory negligence, see,
e.g., Posner, supra note 31, at 200–04; for a precise analysis between the economic differences
see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 5 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 433 (2003).
130 E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 10 (referring to “contributory negligence”, however
it corresponds to the U.S. terminology of comparative negligence).
131 However, difficulties occur when evidentiary uncertainty and court error are added, see
Parts III.A.3 & III.B.3.
132 Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 13.
133 See id. at 27–28.
134 See id. at 29.
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iii. Losses caused by AI vs. AI under the E.U. proposal
So far, the E.U. proposal seems to direct high-risk AI in the best suitable
way. A single AI operator would only engage in an activity if it was socially
desirable and the proper level of care by potential victims was potentially
adequate. Nevertheless, all that glitters is not gold. A counter-intuitive result
will be exemplified hereinafter. The European approach is insufficient due
to its lack of flexibility. A pressing problem looming on the horizon was not
considered by the E.U.: reciprocal accidents of two or more high-risk AI
operators.
The E.U. neglects to consider the impact of the new liability rules for the
long-term. In order to be effective and useful, a framework needs to reflect
the aspect that high-risk based AI systems cause harm to each other. First,
several self-driving cars can cause a collision.135 Second, autonomous
unmanned aircrafts (drones) may crash.136 Third, autonomous robots are able
to cause damage to each other and so on. Scenarios like these do not seem
unrealistic at all and deserve attention before they become part of society on
a daily basis.
In reference to our initial example above, the differences are now that
harm is suffered by each party involved and both parties are high-risk AI
operators. A and B each suffer a $25,000 loss. Both cause and suffer losses.
The total social costs of the accident are now $50,000.137 It is crucial to
recognize that a desirable liability rule must oblige each party to incur the
total social costs of expenses from an accident ($50,000). The proper
incentives for the safety and activity level would be accomplished only if A
has to bear $50,000 (the total social costs). The same applies to B.
(v) Under strict liability with the defense of comparative negligence,
socially optimal care levels of AI operators would be achieved only if courts
are able to calculate optimal care. Otherwise, a scenario similar to no liability
135

See Paul Lienert, Two rival self-driving cars have close call in California, REUTERS TECH.
NEWS, (June 26, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-nearmiss/tworival-self-driving-cars-have-close-call-in-california-idUSKBN0P601T20150626.
136 See, e.g., Dhiraj Gandhi et al., Drone Uses AI and 11,500 Crashes to Learn How to Fly,
IEEE SPECTRUM (May 10, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/drones/droneuses-ai-and-11500-crashes-to-learn-how-to-fly (teaching a drone how to fly autonomously by
crashing into objects).
137 This example, in a simplified form, is based on Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 250–53
(demonstrating the issue described on autonomous vehicles, which are subsumed as high-risk
AI in accordance with the E.U. proposal). Additionally, the findings in terms of the formal
analysis apply also to the following, id. at 264–76.
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might be the outcome. Moreover, comparative negligence might add further
complexity to determine the optimum care standard. Despite the negligence
standard, a suboptimal activity level would remain unchanged. Overall, the
E.U. proposal does not induce socially desirable incentives for AI operators.
This is illustrated by the following: A and B face strict liability.
Consequently, each of them would compensate the other party with the loss
of $25,000. A as well as B would, in fact, bear half of the social costs of an
accident.138 The result is symmetrical to the situation of no liability. 139 To
create efficient liability rules, the E.U. proposal considers the aspect of
comparative negligence to be applied along with strict liability. 140 The injurer
is held liable for harm only if the victim did not act negligently, that is, when
the victim’s level of care was at least her or his level of due care.141 If A
chooses a safety level considering the loss of $25,000, he or she would be
deemed negligent by courts, because A’s level of care is below the total costs
of $50,000 (due care equals optimal care). As a result, A has to recover B for
the harm caused of $25,000 (because of strict liability) as well as compensate
– at least part of – her or his suffered loss of $25,000 (because of comparative
negligence) and vice versa applies to B. Hence, in order to escape
comparative negligence both A and B would choose due care,142 which
equals the total costs of $50,000; otherwise, they would have to additionally
bear their own losses.
Several problematic aspects within this regime occur:
First, courts need to define due care according to the total social costs of
an accident – in our case $50,000, which seems challenging. This might
misguide tort law related to AI; the result of an inappropriate level of care
could impede important AI developments.143 With a new and complex
technology like AI and its back-box problem, it is implausible that courts are
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Cf. Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 255–56.
See supra Part III.B.1.
140 See E.U. Draft Bill, supra note 3, at Art. 4 & Art. 10.
141 See Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 145.
142 Under perfect information comparative negligence creates efficient incentives for the level
of care, see, e.g., Mireia Artigot i Golobardes & Fernando Gómez Pomar, Contributory and
comparative negligence in the law and economics literature, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS
46, 53–59 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
143 See supra Part I. See generally George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability:
Its Sources, Its Effects and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 42–49 (1991).
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able to formulate desirable standards.144 Parties may be led to take either poor
or unnecessarily high care in terms of the court’s information deficit.145
Second, comparative negligence is very costly to administer.146 And
having to face another challenge: the allocation of joint costs for courts;
comparative negligence adds thus further uncertainty.147
Third, if the parties chose their care levels in accordance with the
negligence standard, the level of activity would still be prohibitively high.
Because each only bears half of the social costs – in our case $25,000. Parties
make and receive damage payments due to the aspect of strict liability. Thus,
if both parties chose due care, A would have to compensate B for her or his
losses of $25,000 and B would have to compensate A for her or his losses of
$25,000. The important point to stress is that high-risk AI systems would be
used excessively. Full cost ($50,000) internalization by the parties cannot be
achieved.
It is clear that the more often high-risk AI systems are used, the more
losses will materialize. Different to the aspect when only one high-risk AI
operator is strictly liable, now the activity level of both AI deployers does
not represent the total social costs ($50,000). This insufficient outcome of
the E.U. proposal gets even worse when it comes to activities of companies.
In the foreseeable future, companies will retain the majority of AI users.148
In order to compete on the market, goods have to be offered at the lowest
possible price. If the price does not represent the full social costs, the demand
will be too high and result in a misallocation.149 These issues might result in
serious consequences for the ongoing distribution of high-risk AI.
In conclusion, none of the conventional liability rules would perform
well to regulate the risks emerging from AI. Worse yet, the new E.U.
initiative does not provide a proper solution either. These observations
conclude that the U.S. and E.U. forego important opportunities to reduce the
144

See supra Part III.A.3.
Courts may also wrongly assess the level of care actually taken, see generally John E.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).
146 E.g. there are more claims and therefore more lawsuits in comparison to contributory
negligence, see Stuart Low & Janet Kiholm Smith, Decisions to Retain Attorneys and File
Lawsuits: An Examination of the Comparative Negligence Rule in Accident Law, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 535 (1995).
147 When evidentiary uncertainty and court error are introduced it cannot be generally
concluded that comparative negligence is a superior negligence rule, see Bar-Gill & BenShahar, supra note 129, at 463-64; Cf. Posner, supra note 31, at 201.
148 See citations supra note 37.
149 See Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 47–72.
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risks and enhance desirable development of AI on account of their liability
framework or new proposals.
iv. Shielding businesses to accelerate one’s leadership?
Shielding businesses from liability for the harm caused does not imply
that the leadership of one’s country is strengthened. Once again, it is
necessary to ensure that the price of an activity represents its total costs. This
can only be achieved if the costs of harm caused by dangerous activities are
beard by the actor conducting such activities – so-called cost
internalization.150 On the contrary, where all or parts of the risk continue to
be externalized, individuals would engage excessively in such an activity
because the costs are too low for the activity.151 In general, it is inefficient to
encourage harmful activities, because this would lead to an oversupply
thereof.152 New technologies like AI do not need a special treatment, at least
not in terms of the liability regime, as they will pay their way into society.153

IV. LESSONS FROM THE E.U.
The foregoing elaboration points irresistibly to four lessons which can
be learned from the European attempt to build an AI framework.
First, the European proposed enumerative sectoral approach of high-risk
AI should not be pursued.154 In many cases an AI system might even affect
several sectors and cannot be allocated to one.155 Indeed, it rather shall be
focused on a concrete framework related to the degree of risk. Overall, the
risk-based approach might be an adequate criterion to ensure the general
levels of safety and strengthen the competitiveness of companies. However,
it has been argued that courts tend to be too cautious of new risks because
these are less familiar hazards, and more common ones are not as much of a
danger.156 This issue can only be mitigated by a precise characterization of
high-risk AI, so that non-high-risk AI systems do not face an incongruent
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See Shavell (2004), supra note 101, at 193–97.
See id. at 193–97.
152 See id. at 208–212.
153 See Wagner, supra note 54, at 3.
154
See supra Part II.A.
155
See also Philipp Hacker, AI Regulation
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3556532.
156 See, e.g., Huber, supra note 88, at 319.
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burden.157 Still, a more in-depth and detailed assessment of the qualification
of ‘high-risk’ is necessary to overcome the mentioned difficulties. It seems
that a probability/magnitude test focusing on the riskiness could cure several
difficulties of the E.U. attempt. The impacts of an event will be taken in
relation to its probability of occurrence and the more serious the impact of
the event, the lower its probability of occurrence may be.
The focus on the specific risk of harm can already be located in new
developing areas such as cybersecurity in the U.S.158 If such exemplified first
steps will be continued, an increase of social welfare and a boost of people’s
trust in the usage of AI can be the consequence.
Second, the European declaration of certifying high-risk AI before
placing it on the market might only result in high administrative costs and
should not be pursued.159 Given that the technological potentials of AI are
currently hardly foreseeable, an ex-ante hurdle to enter the market does not
seem desirable. If unprecedented questions exist and regulators may not have
sufficient information in the early stage of AI technology, it cannot
meaningfully be regulated ex ante. Therefore, the obligation that AI
developers require a certificate to distribute their technology may harm a
company’s ability to innovate and to gain.
Overall, banning uncertified high-risk AI systems from the market
without any possibility of foregoing certification seems burdensome,
especially due to the challenging aspects of distinguishing between high-risk
and non-high-risk AI. Socially desirable approaches to the high-risk sector
should thus be based on tort law.
Third, in light of the myriad of challenges mentioned above and due to
the limitations of existing regimes, an adjusted liability framework for AI
seems to be the only viable path. Because applying existing tort law doctrines
may leave losses undesirable under or even uncompensated. As long as the
question of the application of U.S. liability rules is entirely unresolved and
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See Christiane Wendehorst, Strict Liability for AI and other Emerging Technologies, 11 J.
EUR. TORT L. 150, 165–66 (2020) (providing a risk matrix for different categories of risks
concerning AI).
158 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, 1–21 (Apr. 16, 2018) (“[t]he Framework is adaptive to
provide a flexible and risk-based implementation that can be used with a broad array of
cybersecurity risk management processes.”); see also Paul Schwartz, Risk and high risk:
Walking the GDPR tightrope, (Mar. 29, 2016) (distinguishing between two types of risks in
terms of the European GDPR), https://iapp.org/news/a/risk-and-high-risk-walking-the-gdprtightrope/.
159 See supra Part II.B.
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therefore unpredictable,160 tort law potentially has a chilling effect.161
Empirical data has already demonstrated that if legal certainty is provided to
economic operators it can result in higher innovation investments by
mitigating the factor of uncertainty over the litigation trial.162
Nonetheless, the new European approach requires also further
amendments. While the E.U. proposal of strict liability with the defense of
comparative negligence might at least result in a desirable outcome if a
single high-risk AI operator is involved.163 However, the contrary has been
achieved when two high-risk AI operators are reciprocally liable to each
other.164 Efficiency and trust throughout society cannot be accomplished. In
general, the E.U.’s one-size-fits all concept shall not be pursued and rather
serves as primary guideline.
Ultimately, the fourth lesson of the European proposal is to adopt strict
liability with the defense of comparative negligence. But the rule ought to be
applied solely related to events of damages where only one high-risk AI
operator is involved. Thus, a further subdivision between, on the one hand,
accidents of only one high-risk-based AI system involved and,165 on the other
hand, accidents involving at least two high-risk based systems166 could close
the gap within the liability regime. A separate liability rule for the latter
needs to be considered – as is done in Part V.
V. FILLING THE GAPS IN LIABILITY LAW: AN INNOVATIVE PROPOSAL
A. SOLUTION: STRICT LIABILITY TO THE STATE
Throughout the different categories of liability regimes none of them
seems capable of ensuring a social welfare optimum.167 Having explained
why current rules cover AI socially undesirable, the aspect of parties
compensating each other is the crucial one. Now, based on the deliberations

160

See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV.
285, 303–08 (2008).
162 See Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, When does Product Liability Risk Chill Innovation?
Evidence from Medical Implants, at 42 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3207503; See also
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation,
41 RAND J. ECON. 472 (2010).
163 See supra Part III.B.2.
164
See supra Part III.B.3.
165 See supra Part III.B.2.
166 See supra Part III.B.3.
167 See supra Part III.B.
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of Professor Steven Shavell,168 this contribution proposes strict liability with
losses paid to the state,169 not only in the case of autonomous vehicles, but
rather for all cases of loss involving at least two high-risk AI systems.170 This
liability rule serves as an opportunity to close the gaps of the E.U. initiatives.
Under the proposed rule, AI operators will be strictly liable where payments
of harm caused are made to the state instead of compensating the other party.
The characteristic of AI enables its enforcement.
Although, reinventing the proverbial wheel for each new technology
does not seem to be an adequate solution,171 the alternative of applying
current liability frameworks to new technologies are more likely to lead to
socially undesirable results.172 In light of this, the objective of this
contribution is to propose how regulators can fix the old wheel to
accommodate for advancements in technology.
Most importantly, the core problem of a strict liability regime is that it is
not possible to accomplish liability payments of the parties that reflect the
total amount of social losses.173 Further, the duty of courts to formulate
optimal level of care might not result in desirable incentives for society. 174
The following discussion proposes a liability framework where parties make
payments to the state and is capable of closing these gaps.
Under a strict liability to the state scheme, parties would be held strictly
liable for the harm they cause, but payments are made to the state, and not to
the injured party. This structure achieves the socially desirable level of safety
and activity.175 First, none of the high-risk AI operators involved would be
reimbursed for their injuries and each would bear total cost of the harm
caused. Additionally, social optimal incentives are achieved.

168

Shavell (2020), supra note 106 (suggesting strict liability to the state in the context of
autonomous vehicles); Jerry Green, On the optimal structure of liability laws, 7 BELL J. ECON.
553, 553–54 (1976); Shavell (1987), supra note 102, at 29–30.
169 The final designation of “strict liability to the state” is still open to discussion, as it is rather
akin to an administrative penalty than to a liability rule.
170 See supra Part II.A (in terms of the segregation of high-risk and non-high-risk AI).
171 See Lyria B. Moses, How to Think About Law, Regulation and Technology: Problems with
‘Technology’ as a Regulatory Target, 5 L. INNOV. & TECH. 1, 19 (2013).
172 But see Ignacio N. Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 167, 189–91 & 197 (2018) (arguing that analogies are the best method to deal
with new technologies. However, despite the optimism surrounding such analogies, the
aforementioned (Part III.B.) wrong incentives will still be enhanced).
173 See supra Part III.B.
174
See supra Parts II.A.3. & III.B.1.
175 See supra note 125 (the liability of the manufacturer as well as the operator will lead to a
desirable result because the manufacturer will pass on the costs to the operator).
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Using the previous example, A and B are causing damage of $25,000 to
each other,176 the framework’s objective is that each party bears the total
social costs of an accident – in our case $50,000. For example, under the
strictly liability to the state scheme, A has to pay $25,000 to the state for the
losses of B as well as compensate her or his own loss of $25,000. The same
distribution of losses applies to B. Both A and B each pay the total social
costs of $50,000. As a result, parties would undertake the socially desirable
decisions to increase their safety level. Additionally, the resulting level of
activity would be socially desirable. Since both parties’ own losses equal the
social losses ($ 50,000), the parties would consequently choose a socially
correct decision in terms of the activity level to avoid the costs. Thus, the
outcome faced under strict liability to the state would be optimal.177
At first glance, one could suggest that if A and B are each paying the
social costs ($50,000) they cannot act socially desirable because they have
to pay twice the social harm. Together A and B are paying $50,000 to the
state and covering $50,000 for their own losses (in total $100,000), which
would lead to excessive safety as well as overly cautious activity. This
intuition would only be correct if the parties involved made their decisions
cooperatively. But within this model it is assumed that A and B are strangers
to each other and select their safety and activity level independently – as it
might be the case in practice with regard to high-risk AI systems. No
contractual relations are possible before an accident happens.
Most notably, the economic operators will be induced to make
appropriate decisions. For instance, operators will invest in training AI on
data sets that are sufficiently broad to avoid dangerous situations, and keep
robust and accurate records and data.178 The parties in charge will then, out
of their financial self-interest, achieve the socially desirable standards for
society. Furthermore, because AI systems will be used primarily by
companies in the foreseeable future, adequate incentives related to the level
of activity are of the utmost importance to achieve a desirable outcome for
society.179
Critics of strict liability argue that it may impose barriers to market entry
for AI companies.180 However, by deploying strict liability to high-risk AI,
176

See supra Parts III.B.2. & III.B.3.
Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 256–58, 260-61.
178 See E.U. White Paper, supra note 3, at 18–21 (where these criteria are mentioned).
179
See supra Part III.B.3.
180
Bathaee, supra note 51, at 931–32 (“Finally, strict liability may impose significant barriers
to entry. It may simply be too costly, unpredictable, or difficult to produce and deploy AI
without risking potentially ruinous liability. The possibility of unpredictable liability would
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it is possible to remove these barriers to market entry. First, one core aspect
of strict liability is to cover hazardous activities; thus, the unpredictable
manner of AI is predestined for strict liability in the way that economic
operators internalize the associated costs of their activity. 181 Second, if the
associated costs exceed the benefits of the activity, the harmful activity will
not be undergone.182 Now, unlike the discussed certification process
above,183 the ex-ante decision maker in charge is the informed economic AI
operator. It is up to each individual to calculate the costs and benefits of an
activity and finally decide whether or not to undertake it. Further, the
aforementioned critical task by courts to assess a socially optimal level of
care will be assigned to the economic operators,184 who (again) are better
informed about the associated risks and benefits of their activity. 185 Judges
are in charge to ascertain the harm caused and to allocate it to the responsible
parties, which seems efficient, because they are more experienced than other
institutions.186
Further, the aspect that new technologies innovate too quickly for the
liability framework because of the eagerness of judges to punish these for
breaking from the status quo cannot be argued in relation to this proposal.187
Once again, strict liability to the state does not require courts to formulate
any level of care. Further, the aforementioned approach emerges as an
opportunity to achieve the objectives of the U.S. leadership program on
AI.188 The incentives to reduce risks do not dilute because the parties
involved have to bear the total harm caused in an accident – cost
internalization is achieved.

therefore, like a byzantine regulatory structure, provide significant barriers to entry in most
markets where there are already large players”).
181 See Shavell (2018), supra note 46 (arguing that a dangerous activity should be the only
aspect to impose strict liability).
182 See supra note 37 (because mainly companies are the developers of AI, which are aiming
to maximize their net surplus).
183 See supra Part II.B.
184 See supra Parts III.A.3. & III.B.1.
185 Cf. Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Frank Müller-Langer, Strict Liability versus Negligence, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. AND ECON.: TORT L. AND ECON. 3, 11 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009).
186 Scherer, supra note 88, at 388–89.
187 George L. Priest, The Effects of Modern Tort Law on Innovation and Economic Growth,
in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM
273, 273 (Kaufmann Foundation ed., 2011) (tort liability “has operated as a tax . . . without
commensurate benefit to consumers. The effect of expanded tort liability has been to suppress
innovation and reduce U.S. economic growth”); Huber, supra note 88, at 278.
188 White House, supra note 12; See U.S. Draft Mem., supra note 15.
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B. S ELECTED APPLICATION CHALLENGES
Finally, the exemplified solution poses various emerging questions.
Within this contribution four basic issues shall be dealt with. Indubitably,
this listing is not exhaustive.189
i. Scheme of liability without compensation?
The element of furnishing compensation to accident victims is missing
at the regime of strict liability to the state– as it is not necessary. Indeed, this
seems unfamiliar related to liability law. But in order to set the desirable
incentives to reduce risk, not even one of the operators involved needs to be
compensated. On the contrary, the compensation of both parties, as shown
above, would result in an inadequate standard. The broad distribution of firstparty insurance in industrialized economies establishes a less costly
mechanism for compensation than the tort system does by itself.
Accordingly, the adoption of liability is not necessary regarding the
compensation of an injured party.190
ii. Excessive administrative costs?
Before implementing strict liability with damages paid to the state the
costs of administering the treatment of accidents must be taken into
consideration.191 The most pressing problem might be the associated costs
caused by the judicial procedure after losses have occurred. Proving the
obligatory facts of tort law doctrines requires analytical capacity and
technical expertise, which might be prohibitively costly, especially for
victims of AI systems. In general, an analysis of U.S. tort litigation costs has
already demonstrated that the administrative costs are estimated to be 53%
to 54% of net injured party’s benefits.192 Hence, redistributing one dollar
from the tortfeasor to the plaintiff finally represents 53 to 54 cents.
In contrast to other liability regimes, strict liability to the state does not
require knowledge of the standard of care or the level of care actually taken.
It seems relatively easy to administer compared to conventional liability
189

For example, further analysis with regard to insurance, competent authority or the extent
of compensation seems necessary.
190 See Wagner, supra note 54, at 3; Shavell (2020), supra note 106, at 279; See generally
TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (Gerhard Wagner ed., 2005).
191
Calabresi (1970), supra note 53, at 28 (so-called tertiary costs).
192 James S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation,
RAND REP. NO. R-3391-ICJ, at 68–71 (1986); See also Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost
Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073 (2002).
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rules.193 But the determination of the responsible party as well as the amount
of harm caused may still increase the associated costs. Of course, these final
impacts are empirical questions and cannot be examined within this
contribution. A possible approach to circumvent this issue might be the
establishment of a blanket fee depending on which high-risk AI system
caused the damage. Different high-risk AI Systems would be categorized,
and payment would depend thereon. Moreover, such a suggestion is not
uncommon because insurance companies cannot know an individual insurer
in advance, they must predict certain classes of policyholders. Hence, an
insurer already sorts the same risks and so calculates the insurance premiums
ex ante, which ought to internalize the full amount of associated costs of an
accident.194
iii. Scope of application by scenarios of mixed liability?
When mixed liability regimes are employed, the ideal incentives are
going to dilute. Reinforcing the view that a distinction among accidents is
paramount. Namely between accidents of (i) a single high-risk AI system
and other operators (e.g. humans or other objects) on the one hand, and (ii)
solely high-risk AI systems on the other hand. Assuming in light of the initial
example195 that the high-risk AI operator is held strictly liable to the state,
whereas the counterpart is held strictly liable with payments to the other
party. Now, the AI operator would have to bear only half of the total harm,
because he or she pays $25,000 to the state but at the same time he or she is
also compensated by the other one. The outcome is inefficient due to the fact
that high-risk AI systems will be compensated.
Additionally, if the injurer uses a high-risk AI system that suffers little
or no harm, and the victim suffers almost all of the harm, strict liability with
a defense of comparative negligence will likely be able to achieve a socially
desirable risk reduction – as analyzed above.196 In terms of at least two highrisk AI systems involved, the gap between the socially desirable outcome

See supra Part V.A. Philosophical questions like ‘justice’ would not arise, see generally
Green, supra note 168, at 554.
194 Herbert I. Weisberg & Thomas J. Tomberlin, A Statistical Perspective on Actuarial
Methods for Estimating Pure Premiums from Cross-Classified Data, 49 J. RISK & INS. 539
(1982); Cheng Hsiao et al., A Statistical Perspective on Insurance Rate-Making, 44 J.
ECONOMETRICS 5 (1990).
195 See supra Parts III.B.2. & III.B.3.
196 See supra Part III.B.2.
193
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and the result of the applicable liability regime might be prohibitively
large.197 Strict liability to the state alone is capable of closing this gap.
iv. Strict Liability to the State beyond AI applications?
If strict liability to the state instills (constantly) socially optimal
behavior, this regime should be broadly employed for any combination of
cases of loss even without the engagement of AI. The proposed liability
regime would always induce the proper incentives to take care and choose
desirable levels of activity in the context of any accident. But the
ascertainment of accidents would not be a trivial task. If victims are not
compensated, they would not have any incentives to sue.198 Further, parties
involved in an accident would have no advantageous reason to notify the
state that an accident occurred. It would, in fact, be even an incentive for the
parties concerned to conceal accidents because all of them are able to jointly
save a proportionate amount of their own losses.199 However, the special
future of AI offers the unique capability to report accidents through
electronic systems, which are able to furnish the public authorities access to
the gathered information of an accident.200 Already prospering research can
be conducted on the technical implementation of specific transmitters.201
Overall, it may not be necessary to entirely reinvent a new agency to ensure
compliance; rather those already in existence could take over this part. The
accompanying administrative costs may be low and the chance to circumvent
the reporting of accidents almost impossible.
Of course, privacy and data protection rules will have a strong impact on
the implementation of such a reporting system. Additionally, assessment of
how to collect, record or store the data of the harm caused by AI systems
seems advisable. Especially the aspects of traceability and auditability in the
context of privacy law need specific deliberations.

VI. CONCLUSION: A ROADMAP
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Undoubtedly, AI is capable of many further breakthroughs in the years
and decades to come. As noted, AI strongly influences and challenges tort
law doctrines. A solid liability regime for efficient and trustworthy AI will
constitute the foundation to ensure a social welfare optimum and enable a
frictionless market for further AI development. This contribution allocates
the opportunity to establish such a flexible normative framework instead of
a one-size-fits-all system. If the technology is to be used for the benefit of
society, a framework should lead to the desired result in all different
scenarios. Ultimately, the U.S. might therefore pursue the following path:
1. The E.U. initiatives on the differentiation between high-risk AI and
non-high-risk AI shall only serve as a guideline. Focusing mainly on the
riskiness of AI instead of sector specific applications could be a desirable
path. Still, a fostered discussion on a flexible and, at the same time,
determined distinction is advisable.
2. Existing tort doctrines are not capable of ensuring a social welfare
optimum within the application of AI. The E.U. proposal – strict liability
with the defense of comparative negligence – provides already desirable
incentives with regard to losses when only one high-risk AI operator is
involved and shall only cover such circumstances. Especially since each AI
system can sustain harm in an accident. The E.U. approach should not be
applied to accidents of several high-risk AI operators.
3. In scenarios where two or more high-risk AI operators cause harm to
each other. Tort law doctrines cannot optimally address the emerging issues
of such AI accidents. The solution is called strict liability with damages paid
to the state. Payments are made to the state instead of compensating the other
party involved. Further, to ensure its compliance, the technology shall entail
an electronical tool to report an event of losses between high-risk AI
operators automatically.
In sum, the E.U. declarations are neither a final breakthrough nor a mere
token of an initial liability regime. These European initiatives do not delve
into the essential issues – a flexible system that is capable of achieving an
optimal solution for society in the long run. Overall, it is precisely this
flexibility that the E.U. draft lacks. Now it is up to the U.S. to be at the
forefront of AI enhancement, and the aforementioned proposed roadmap
leads to a desirable path.

